Tax Wedges, Unemployment Benefits and Labour Market Outcomes in the New EU Members by Alberto Behar
AUCO Czech Economic Review 3 (2009) 69–92
Acta Universitatis Carolinae Oeconomica
Received 25 September 2008; Accepted 23 January 2009
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Abstract There has been a widely accepted belief that certain labor market institutions, includ-
ing high taxation and generous beneﬁts, can lead to low employment and/or high unemployment.
To what extent do such priors about tax wedges and unemployment beneﬁts apply to the new
members of the EU? Principal Component Analysis (PCA) suggests the new members share
similar characteristics to each other and should be grouped separately from the rest of Europe.
There are statistically signiﬁcant differences in the medians of unemployment beneﬁts and the
labor market outcomes of the less productive workers, but insigniﬁcant differences in prime-
age outcomes and tax wedges. Within the new members, our non-parametric analysis ﬁnds tax
wedges and the duration of beneﬁts (not the replacement ratio) are associated with poor labor
market outcomes, but the evidence is weak.
Keywords Labour market institutions, principal component analysis
JEL classiﬁcation J21, J48, J68, P27 ∗
1. Introduction
The extent to which labour market institutions can account for differences in labor
market performance has been cause for long-running debate.1 In terms of Freeman’s
(2005, p. 137) analysis of the “Case against labor institutions”, it appears that the
aggregate evidence is too weak to convict, but that strong priors drive the judgment
passed by many studies. However, there is enough empirical evidence to advance high
taxes and improperly designed unemployment beneﬁts systems as lead suspects for
detrimental effects on labor market outcomes.2 Were the institutional suspects lined
up against a wall, taxes and beneﬁts would be picked by many witnesses.
The case is complicated by evidence suggesting complicity between taxes, beneﬁts
and other aspects of labor market institutions.3 This leads to arguments that good labor
∗ University of Oxford, Department of Economics, Manor Road, OX1 3UQ Oxford, United Kingdom.
Phone: +44 (0) 7817 099 783, E-mail: alberto.behar@economics.ox.ac.uk.
1 Nickell and Layard (1999) is a seminal work in this ﬁeld. More recent work assigning a role to institu-
tional features includes Bassanini and Duval (2006), which has been incorporated in the OECD Employment
Outlook (OECD 2006), and Nickel, Nunziata and Ochel (2005). A more skeptical view is offered in Allard
and Lindert (2006), and Baker, Glyn Howell and Schmitt (2005).
2 On balance, empirical studies are more likely to ﬁnd signiﬁcant effects for these variables than others.
Baker, Glyn, Howell and Schmitt (2005) suggest ﬁndings for taxes and or beneﬁts are the most robust,
although they argue the evidence is weak overall.
3 Forexample,interactioneffectsarefoundinDaveriandTabellini(2000),andEuropeanCommission(2004).
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market outcomes can be achieved with more than one combination of labor market
policies. For example, the approach in Nordic countries is very different to that of the
Anglo-Saxon economies.
Excluding Cyprus and Malta, the European Union has 10 new members as of 2007,
whichwewillrefertoasCentralandEasternEuropean(CEE)countriesortheCEE10.4
While these countries share many features associated with their status as converging
economies, theirjoiningtheEUpromptsthequestionofwhether, intermsoflabormar-
ket institutions and outcomes, they should be classiﬁed separately in their own group,
or whether they fall neatly into one of the existing “Old Europe” categories. Another
pertinent question to address is to what extent any priors on the link between labor
market institutions and outcomes would apply to the CEE countries. For example, is
the view that high taxes and generous beneﬁts can be detrimental to labor market out-
comes in some settings more justiﬁed or less justiﬁed in the CEE countries? Bearing
in mind that all the relevant variables are in a state of ﬂux, we use snapshots of the data
to begin to answer this question in three ways.
First, we use data to classify European countries in four groups deﬁned by labor
market outcomes in 2001–2005 and policy/environment variables in 2005. Section 2
employs principal component analysis (PCA), which is used to summarize a number
of variables into easily-interpretable summary statistics. The exercise provides a cross-
sectional snapshot of the data without any consideration of evolution over time or of
potential relationships. Our results suggest the new members are relatively similar to
each other and should be classiﬁed separately as a group. In particular, the CEE10
appear to experience relatively bad labor market outcomes but do not have conditions
accused of being bad for labor outcomes. This simple observation suggests that, even
with strong priors that institutions are to blame, it would be wrong to tell CEE countries
to make their tax/beneﬁt systems “better like the rest of Europe”.
Second, we turn our attention to speciﬁc labor market, tax and beneﬁt variables
in Section 3. Much research compares the values for an individual country to the
OECD, EU15 or broader European average, but does not indicate whether this is a
characteristic of that country or of most new members. Furthermore, work which
compares averages of the old and new members to conclude one variable is higher
than the other does not take account of the variation within each group, in particular
outliers that could move the mean.5
To address this gap in the literature, we use Mann-Whitney statistics to test the hy-
pothesis that the CEE10 and EU15 countries come from the same distribution against
the alternative that EU15 values are higher. This non-parametric two-sample test works
in small samples, is robust to outliers, and makes few distributional assumptions. Us-
ing 2001–2005 averages, the tests show outcomes for the less educated and youth are
signiﬁcantly worse in the CEE10, but that outcomes for prime-age employment are
not. Using 2005 data, the beneﬁts system is signiﬁcantly less generous, but tax wedges
are not signiﬁcantly different. From this observation, one would not be able to claim
4 This follows the labelling in Schiff, Egoume-Bossogo, Ihara, Konuki and Krajnyak (2006). Vork, Leetma,
Paulus and Anspal (2006) refer to the “New Member States” (NMS).
5 Examples include Vork et al. (2006), and Ederveen and Thissen (2004).
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generous beneﬁts and high taxes account for the relatively poor performance of the
CEE countries as a whole.
Third, we turn our attention to potential relationships between speciﬁc variables
within the CEE countries. Section 4 reviews some of the existing evidence. As we have
already suggested, the evidence is not conclusive, but identiﬁes tax wedges and unem-
ployment beneﬁts as potentially detrimental. In Section 5, we present non-parametric
indicators of correlation between tax wedges, unemployment beneﬁts and a variety of
labor market outcomes in the new members. Our approach is complementary to the
regression-based work of Vork et al. (2006). Unlike standard ﬁxed effects estimates,
our method is appropriate for small samples, is robust to outliers, and focuses on the
cross-sectional relationships often hidden in the ﬁxed effects. Our results point to a
negative effect of high tax wedges on labor market outcomes. They also suggest that,
while a high beneﬁts replacement ratio is not bad for the labor market, long duration
of those beneﬁts is. Section 6 concludes.
2. Are the CEE different?
This and the next section provide a characterization of the data to examine whether the
CEE countries are similar to the existing members. Good labor market outcomes do
not map to a unique set of policies. For example, England and Denmark have enjoyed
relatively good labor market performance despite having very different rules governing
their labor markets. It can therefore be instructive to group countries according to one
or more of their characteristics. One can distinguish between Anglo-Saxon, Nordic and
Continental countries as in Nickell and Layard (1999). In a similar spirit, this section
analyzes whether, in terms of labor market outcomes and a selection of environmen-
tal/policy variables, the CEE should be classiﬁed differently to the rest of Europe. Such
classiﬁcation requires a method for summarizing numerous features of the countries’
economies into easily interpretable characteristics. To do this, we employ principal
component analysis (PCA).
The procedure of PCA starts with the search for the linear combination of the vari-
ables that produces the maximum possible variance. This linear combination is the
ﬁrst (principal) component. The second component is the linear combination of the
same variables having a maximum variance, subject to its being uncorrelated with the
ﬁrst component. In general, one can have as many components as variables, but the
aim is to have the ﬁrst few components explain a large portion of the total variance.
The vector of coefﬁcients (or “weights”) is the eigenvector associated with the largest
eigenvalue of the correlation matrix of the underlying variables. This applies to subse-
quent components also; that is, the kth principal component comes from the kth eigen-
vector. Deciding how many components to use depends on the purpose at hand and
on a number of features of the data. It can be useful to employ rotation techniques to
aid interpretation of the components. We employ the orthogonal Varimax rotation. In
our application, the analysis is conducted on the actual values of the underlying vari-
ables but also on their ranks. The results are similar but we present those based on the
ranks. The use of ranks is consistent with the statistical analysis based on ranked data
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throughout the paper. Further discussion on the methodology of PCA can be found in
Jolliffee (2002).
Table 1 presents the ﬁrst two vectors formed by an analysis of six variables using
data for 30 European countries. Descriptions of the data are available in the Appendix.
In particular, the unemployment trap is a measure of the marginal effective tax rate
faced by an individual moving from unemployment to employment, taking into ac-
count taxes and/or beneﬁts. Our constructed beneﬁts measure combines the length and
duration of unemployment beneﬁts. Employment, unemployment and GDP growth are
averages from 2001–2005 while the other data are for 2005.
The two vectors form the basis for the two dimensions along which the countries
are classiﬁed. The coefﬁcients, sometimes referred to as factor loadings, are a measure
of the degree of association between the variable and the component. Large positive
numbers (with a maximum of unity) signify a strong positive correlation with the un-
derlying component while large negative numbers (a minimum of −1) signify a strong
negative correlation. All numbers with an absolute value of less than 0.3 have been
omitted. The two principal components cumulatively explain 66% of the variation in
the data.6











Cumulative variation 0.33 0.66
As shown in Vector 1, the bottom two variables, which are labor market outcomes,
are not related to the ﬁrst component. The other variables are related to the ﬁrst com-
ponent. We interpret the ﬁrst component as a labor market environment component,
or “environment” for short. The bottom two variables are correlated with the second
component, so we can interpret the second component as labor market outcomes. This
ignores the fact that the tax wedge is also related to the second component.7 Em-
ployment and unemployment, have a Pearson correlation of −0.72. While negative
as expected, it is some way short of −1. This motivates the inclusion of two separate
6 This is a little bit low, but the subsequent components do not yield useful insights for this application.
7 The tax wedge is related to both components and the second component actually captures a combination
of the tax wedge and labour market outcomes. This is an issue we return to in Section 5. For now, we record
that the presence of the tax wedge does not drive our key ﬁndings for this section. The main reason is that,
as will be shown in Section 3, tax wedges do not differ materially between the CEE and the rest of Europe,
so they are not inﬂuencing the CEE countries in a systematic way.
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measures. As suggested by a referee, this is attributable to systematic variations in
participation rates.
Using the prior that high taxes, a severe unemployment trap, generous beneﬁts and
weak growth can be described as conditions less conducive to good labor market out-
comes, we can describe a country with these features as a “bad” environment. In terms
of the policy variables, we can distinguish between laissez faire and interventionist
environments. An observation with high unemployment and low employment has a
“bad” labor market outcome.
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Notes: Countries in black are CEE10 countries. Values are normalized to have a mean of zero. Labor market
outcomes are measured on the y-axis, with countries having worse outcomes in the top half and those having
better outcomes in the bottom half. The environment is measured on the x-axis. Countries having less
favorable environments are on the right and those with more favorable environments are on the left.
Figure 1 plots the scores of the countries, which we interpret as weighted averages
of the variables in each component, using the same axes as those in Table 1. A high
score for component 1 (on the right hand side of the graph) indicates countries with
a “bad” environment. Similarly, a high score for component 2 (the top half) indicates
countries that have worse labor market outcomes. For example, based on employment
rates and unemployment rates, Poland has the worst labor market outcome of all the
countries in Europe.
It is immediately striking that the top left quadrant consists almost exclusively of
the CEE10 countries, which are in black. The observations in grey are other European
countries. Only one CEE10 country is not in the top left quadrant, but it is close. This
graph strongly suggests that we should group the CEE10 together, separately from the
rest of Europe. These countries can be summarized as having relatively poor labor
market outcomes without necessarily having a poor environment. We remark that this
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key result, namely the grouping of the CEE countries together, is robust to the choice
of speciﬁcation for the PCA. In other words, the CEE are generally found clustered
together in the same orthant for a wide selection of variables.8
A comparison with OECD (2006a, p. 204) in Figure 2 is instructive. Their y-axis is
the same as ours and their x-axis captures features of labor market institutions, which
can be summarized by the degree of intervention. Of the countries common to both
samples, thirteen are in the same quadrant, two are not, and one is on the border. The
locations within the quadrants are also similar.9 While we have ten CEE countries, the
OECD sample has three: Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic. These countries
are the only inhabitants of the OECD bad outcome/low intervention quadrant. Our data
shows they are joined by another six CEE countries (plus Greece, which is not in their
sample). The only CEE country outside this quadrant is Slovenia, which is more or
less in the centre of Figure 1.10

















































































































-4.0 -3.0 -2.0 -1.0 0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0  4.0
Source: OECD (2006a, p. 204), accessed directly at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/323044064232.
The OECD ﬁndings and the results here suggest the classiﬁcation given in Table 2.
The left column represents countries with a “good” environment, the right column cap-
8 We present this speciﬁcation precisely because of the convenient interpretation it offers, despite the pres-
ence of the tax wedge in the second component.
9 Furthermore, their ﬁndings also suggest the tax wedge is related to both components.
10 The location of Malta and Cyprus also justiﬁes a separate treatment of these new members of the EU, as
done by other studies, like Vork, Leetma, Paulus and Anspal (2006).
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tures those with a “bad” environment, the top row contains those with “bad” outcomes
and the bottom row has countries with “good” outcomes. The classiﬁcation is con-
sistent with other groupings of countries (eg. Nickell and Layard 1999; Daveri and
Tabellini 2000). Here, we add a fourth distinct group, namely the CEE10 countries,
albeit with a slightly narrower range of variables.11






3. Which variables are different?
This section continues to examine potential differences between the old and new mem-
bers by checking for their statistical signiﬁcance. In the PCA in Section 2, we used
aggregate variables — for example overall employment rates — but in this section we
disaggregate somewhat — for example breaking down employment rates into those for
youth, of prime-age and the less-educated.
Table 3 compares speciﬁc aspects of labor market outcomes between the CEE10
and EU15 based on averages from 2001-2005.12 Appendix 1 contains the data deﬁni-
tions and sources. The table shows the medians and arithmetic means for the CEE10
and the EU15 as well as their ratios. The second last row uses the Mann and Whitney
(1947) test13 to test the null hypothesis that EU15 countries are drawn from the same
distribution as CEE10 countries, against the alternative that EU15 countries have big-
ger values. Conditional on a country being part of the EU15, the last row shows the
estimated probability its observed value will be higher than that of a CEE10 country.
For the 15–64 age group, employment rates are on average six percentage points
higher in the EU15. The difference is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level and the
probability that the true EU15 median is higher is 0.81. For the same age group, we
11 A slight adjustment to the vertical axis would group the CEE countries with 3 Mediterranean countries,
suggesting the new members are most similar to this group of old EU members. Classiﬁcations that separate
continental and Mediterranean countries can be found in the literature. For example, Sapir (2005) produces
such a classiﬁcation when analyzing features of European social models.
12 The average is used to account for cyclical effects. However, for countries that are reforming fast, differ-
ences over ﬁve years can capture genuine structural changes.
13 A Mann-Whitney test is similar to a two-sample t-test, but is designed for small samples, does not make
distributional assumptions, and is robust to outliers. To perform a Mann-Whitney test, the values for CEE10
countries and for EU15 countries are combined and given rankings. The statistic is then calculated as fol-
lows: U = M−T , where U = test statistic, M = the maximum value that the sum of the ranks of the EU15
states could take, T = the actual sum of the ranks of the EU15 states. Thus, U = 0 would mean every EU15
country is higher than the highest CEE10 country. If, after comparison with tabulated critical values, U is
low enough, then we can say the EU15 countries have signiﬁcantly higher values than the CEE10 countries.
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see that unemployment is much higher in the CEE10, the difference being statistically
signiﬁcant at 2%. Given employment is higher and unemployment is lower in the
EU15, it is no surprise that activity levels are only moderately higher and that the
difference is only signiﬁcant at 6%.
Table 3. Comparison of labor market outcomes in the CEE10 and EU15 (2001–2005 averages)
Employment % Unemployment % Activity %
Total Prime Youth Low Total Youth Total Prime Youth
15–64 25–54 15–24 Educated 15–64 15–24 15–64 25–54 15–24
EU15
median 66.10 79.60 40.40 36.90 5.90 14.30 70.94 85.40 47.10
mean 66.08 78.84 41.61 38.50 6.75 15.49 71.70 83.81 47.40
CEE10
median 59.55 76.15 27.45 20.20 10.55 20.25 68.85 86.00 36.30
mean 59.06 75.86 26.73 22.25 11.30 23.78 66.73 84.44 35.18
Ratio
median 0.90 0.96 0.68 0.55 1.79 1.42 0.97 1.01 0.77
mean 0.89 0.96 0.64 0.58 1.67 1.53 0.93 1.01 0.74
Pmedians 0.01 0.14 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.46 0.02
PEU15>CEE10 0.81 0.68 0.83 0.92 0.19 0.25 0.73 0.41 0.79
Notes: Pmedians denotes the probability that the medians in the CEE10 and EU15 countries are equal, given
the observed data, is less than the number indicated; PEU15>CEE10 is the probability that the observed value
for a given EU15 country is higher than that of a CEE10 country.
Turningtoparticularcategories,employment rates for prime-age workers are rough-
ly equal and not signiﬁcantly different, while employment rates for the youth and low-
educated are signiﬁcantly lower in the CEE10. For example, an EU15 country has an
83% chance of having a greater youth employment rate than a CEE10 country. The dis-
tinction between prime-age workers and youth extends to activity rates: the CEE have
practically the same prime-age mean/median as the EU15 but have signiﬁcantly lower
youth participation. Youth unemployment is also worse in the converging countries.14
Another potential source of difference is older workers (above 55). The incentives
facing older workers are affected by the pensions system, which is not the focus of
this study. Nonetheless, we ﬁnd that activity rates in the EU15 are higher but not
signiﬁcantly so.15 Table 3 presented 2001-2005 averages. Appendix 2 presents 2005
data. The key results are the same, except that unemployment rates are no longer
signiﬁcantly different.
Youth and low-educated labor market outcomes are relatively bad in all countries,
but this analysis suggests the problem is particularly acute in the CEE10. Relating
this to the PCA of the previous section, it appears the generally worse employment
outcomes summarized by total employment and unemployment are being driven by
poor outcomes for the less-productive elements of the population.
14 We do not have comparable prime age unemployment data.
15 The mean in the EU15 is 45% while the CEE10 average is 39%. The p-value for the difference is 0.20.
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median 40 39.5 50.67 65 15 62.5 80 51 75
mean 41.78 37.96 48.15 60.21 n/a 59.43 77.12 46.88 64.15
CEE10
median 37.5 41.55 50.67 50 9 45 67 32 66
mean 38.4 40.18 49.85 50.5 n/a 42.6 68.02 34.34 58.98
Ratio
median 0.94 1.05 1 0.77 0.6 0.72 0.84 0.63 0.88
mean 0.92 1.06 1.04 0.84 n/a 0.72 0.88 0.73 0.92
Pmedians 0.24 0.41 0.58 0.12 0.01 0.02 0.1 0.07 0.11
PEU15>CEE10 0.66 0.4 0.43 0.69 0.88 0.81 0.7 0.72 0.69
Notes: Pmedians denotes the probability that the medians in the CEE10 and EU15 countries are equal, given
the observed data, is less than the number indicated; PEU15>CEE10 is the probability that the observed
value for a given EU15 country is higher than that of a CEE10 country; ∗ see text and data appendix for
explanation of terms.
Table 4 presents 2005 data on aspects of the tax and beneﬁts system, which are
described in Appendix 1.16 Ben rat refers to the beneﬁts replacement ratio, while
Ben durgivesthedurationofbeneﬁts. Ben 9combinesquantityanddurationbygiving
the ratio of beneﬁts to wages over the ﬁrst nine months. It also includes information on
minimum wages, which shows they are not different. When we consider the low-wage
tax wedge, we see it is about 5% higher in a CEE country. However, this difference is
not statistically signiﬁcant. After adjusting for (slightly) higher VAT rates in the EU15,
we see the median VAT-adjusted wedge is identically equal.17
Figure 3 provides indications of the location and spread of the tax wedge (exclud-
ing VAT) in the EU15 and CEE10. Examination of Figure 3 shows the median is
slightly higher in the CEE10, which we observed in Table 4. However, the height of
the box and the distance between the maximum and minimum values indicates consi-
derable heterogeneity within the EU15. In contrast, CEE10 wedges are relatively close
together, as indicated by a relatively compressed box. In a pattern typical of many
variables, within-group variation often exceeds that between groups.
The 2005 tax wedge data, ordered from highest to lowest, is shown in Table 5.
The CEE are ﬂanked from above and below by EU15 countries. For completeness, we
include information on other European countries. Slovakia has the lowest tax wedge,
while Lithuania and Hungary have the highest tax wedge.18 Adjusting tax wedges
16 The variables in this table are not as susceptible to cyclical effects, so the latest possible information
is used. Also, data availability precludes construction of comparable data for the entire 2001-2005 period,
especially for beneﬁts.
17 Standard measures of the tax wedge do not account for consumption taxes, although a theoretical case
can be made for their inclusion (eg. Nickell 2004). The data appendix describes the rudimentary procedure
used to adjust for consumption. Our results do not really depend on the choice of tax wedge, partly because,
as shown in Table 6, VAT rates do not vary much.
18 Out of 30 countries, Slovakia and Hungary had the biggest falls in the tax wedge between 2001 and 2005.
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Table 5. Low-wage tax wedges in Europe (2005)
Country Not VAT adjusted VAT adjusted
% Rank % Rank
Belgium 49.1 1 57.93 1
Germany 46.7 2 54.05 3
Sweden 46.5 3 57.2 2
Lithuania 43.2 4 51.86 7
Hungary 42.9 5 52.42 5
Austria 42.5 6 52.08 6
Poland 42.4 7 51.6 8
Romania 42.4 7 52.79 4
Czech Republic 42.1 9 51.34 11
Turkey 41.9 10 50.76 13
Italy 41.7 11 51.42 10
France 41.4 12 51 12
Netherlands 41.3 13 50.67 14
Latvia 41.0 14 50 16
Estonia 39.8 15 48.98 17
Finland 39.5 16 50.41 15
Denmark 39.3 17 51.44 9
Slovenia 36.4 18 47 19
Bulgaria 36.3 19 46.92 20
Spain 35.7 20 44.57 23
Slovakia 35.3 21 45.63 21
Greece 34.4 22 44.87 22
Norway 34.3 23 47.44 18
Portugal 31.7 24 43.55 24
United Kingdom 29.9 25 40.34 25
Luxemburg 29.8 26 38.96 26
Switzerland 26.7 27 31.88 29
Iceland 23.6 28 38.63 27
Ireland 19.9 29 33.8 28
Cyprus 19.1 30 29.65 30
Malta 18.7 31 31.1 31
CEE10 median 41.55 50.67
EU15 median 39.5 50.67
EU27 median 41 50.67
for VAT does not signiﬁcantly alter the rankings of the CEE countries, except that
Lithuania does not rank as highly while Romania attains the highest percentage.
While taxes do not systematically differ between the EU15 and CEE10, many mea-
sures of beneﬁts do. The replacement ratio of initial unemployment beneﬁts is lower
in the CEE10, but not signiﬁcantly so. However, the duration19 of beneﬁts is signi-
ﬁcantly lower in the CEE10. Combining these measures by calculating the average
replacement ratio received over the ﬁrst 9 months from various forms of unemploy-
ment beneﬁts, we conclude unemployment beneﬁts are signiﬁcantly less generous in
the CEE10 than the EU15.
19 Some countries have indeﬁnite beneﬁts. If we attach an arbitrarily high value for these, the median is a
representative statistic and the Mann-Whitney test is still informative.
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Notes: The horizontal line inside the shaded box is the median. The 25th and 75th percentiles are denoted
by the edges of the box. The horizontal lines outside the box denote the largest and smallest values in the
sample, provided they are not statistical outliers.

























































Notes: The horizontal line inside the shaded box is the median. The 25th and 75th percentiles are denoted
by the edges of the box. The horizontal lines outside the box denote the largest and smallest values in the
sample, provided they are not statistical outliers, which are labeled separately.
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Figure 4 shows the CEE country with the most generous beneﬁts (Bulgaria) is
located below the EU15 median at an average ratio of 60%. The least generous country
is Romania. The measures of marginal effective tax rates in the ﬁnal three columns of
Table 4 suggest the potential disincentives to participate in the labor market are greater
in the EU15 than the CEE10. This is consistent with the ﬁnding that tax wedges are
not much higher but beneﬁts replacement is lower.
Table 6. Beneﬁts in Europe (2005)
Country Beneﬁt ratio Beneﬁt duration Combination
% Rank Months Rank % Rank
United Kingdom 15 1 12 15 15 1
Romania 23 2 8 6 19 2
Poland 30 3 12 15 30 3
Ireland 33 4 15 19 33 4.5
Slovakia 50 8 6 3 33 4.5
Hungary 60 13.5 9 10 36 6
Estonia 45 5 9 10 43 7
Latvia 50 8 9 10 47 8.5
Czech Republic 47 6 n/a n/a 47 8.5
Greece 50 8 9 10 50 10
Italy 70 22.5 7 4 52 11
Slovenia 70 22.5 3 1 53 12
Austria 55 10.5 inﬁnite∗ 27 55 13
Lithuania 70 22.5 7.5 5 58 14
Germany 60 13.5 9 10 60 16.5
Belgium 55 10.5 inﬁnite∗ 27 60 16.5
Iceland 60 13.5 60 25 60 16.5
Bulgaria 60 13.5 9 10 60 16.5
Portugal 65 17 24 23 65 20
France 65 17 15 19 65 20
Cyprus 69 19 5 2 65 20
Spain 65 17 14 17 67 22
Netherlands 70 22.5 n/a n/a 70 24
Finland 70 22.5 23 22 70 24
Norway 70 22.5 18 21 70 24
Malta 80 27 inﬁnite∗ 27 80 27
Sweden 80 27 12 15 80 27
Switzerland 80 27 15 19 80 27
Croatia 100 30 9 10 87 29
Denmark 90 29 36 24 90 30
CEE10 median 50 9 45
EU15 median 65 15 62.5
EU27 median 60 10.5 56.5
Note: ∗ Inﬁnite durations assigned an arbitrary value of 100 for statistical work.
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Table 6 presents details by listing all the countries and the beneﬁts measures. The
data are sorted by our combined measure of beneﬁts and duration. The United King-
dom is at the top; its beneﬁts system is much less generous than that in the rest of the
EU15. Generally, new members are near the top of the table.
In summary, this section shows that the main sources of differences between the
CEE10 and EU15 appear to lie in worse labor market outcomes of the less productive
and in lower marginal effective tax rates, which are driven by less generous unemploy-
ment beneﬁts. The differences are not to be found in minimum wages, tax wedges or
prime-agelabormarketoutcomes. Wenowturntoananalysisofpotentialrelationships
between taxes, beneﬁts and employment outcomes within the CEE10.
4. Therelationshipsbetweentaxes, beneﬁtsandlabourmarketoutcomes: existing
theory and evidence
Having provided snapshots of the data in the previous two sections, we proceed to ex-
amine possible relationships between taxes, beneﬁts and employment outcomes. We
discuss the theory and existing evidence on their links in this section before comple-
menting it with our own measures of association within the CEE10 in Section 5.
4.1 Theory
The tax wedge is the difference between the cost of employment to a ﬁrm and the real
take-home pay received by the worker (Blanchard 2006). The taxes potentially relevant
for labor market outcomes include payroll taxes, taxes on labor income, social security
contributions20 and consumption taxes. It is intuitive to consider taxes paid by the
ﬁrm as affecting labor demand and taxes paid by the worker as affecting labor supply.
However, standard theoretical treatments show it is the total tax wedge that matters, not
thelegalincidence. Bythisargument, thesameemploymentoutcomeoccursregardless
of whether we think of the impact of the tax wedge as one on demand or supply. This
result applies to labor markets in competitive equilibrium and those subject to some
form of bargaining, but does not apply, for example, if many workers are subject to a
binding minimum wage.21
Focusing on supply, tax wedges can theoretically have a positive or negative in-
ﬂuence on labor force participation, depending on competing income and substitution
effects. Textbook treatments typically regard the alternative to work as leisure, such
that the income effect allows one to enjoy more leisure. In the CEE economies, the
more appropriate alternative might be work outside the formal sector, be it in the black
market or subsistence/household activity. If this is the case, justifying the source of an
income effect is more difﬁcult. Whether the effect of tax wedges is predominantly on
employment quantities or on wages depends on the incidence of the tax, which depends
on the elasticity of supply relative to demand.
20 This depends on how much of the contributions are linked to future beneﬁts received by the employee.
21 Good discussions are available in Nickell (1997, 2004), Blanchard (2006), and Carlin and Soskice (2006,
p. 107).
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Ceteris paribus, tax wedges will have a bigger negative employment effect if labor
supply is elastic, which is more likely if the income effect is small and the substitution
effect is large. The previous paragraph has hinted that the income effect may be small
in the CEE countries, which implies the tax wedge would have a relatively large ne-
gative effect. Furthermore, Gora, Radizwill, Sowa and Walewski (2006) show convex
labor supply curves imply the labor supply curve is relatively more elastic for those
towards the low end of the earnings spectrum. The presence of unemployment beneﬁts
and/or binding minimum wages can make the effective labor supply curve more elastic
for low-wage workers.
Wedges can affect participation in the labor market but, holding recorded activity
in the labor market constant, they can also affect the mix of employment and unem-
ployment. In situations where wages are bargained over, higher tax wedges make the
outside option – such as unemployment or work in the informal sector while register-
ing as unemployed – more attractive. This bids up equilibrium wages. Because of the
positive slope of the wage curve, higher wages imply higher ofﬁcial unemployment
and lower employment.
Unemployment beneﬁts affect the incentives for someone to search for work. If
they subsidize costly search activities, the effect can be positive. If they encourage
searchers to decrease their work effort or hold out for better paying jobs, the effect
on equilibrium employment is negative.22 In a bargaining model, generous beneﬁts
increase the value of the outside option available to workers and make workers less
averse to unemployment. This strengthens their bargaining position, so they bid up the
equilibrium wage at the cost of higher unemployment.
4.2 Evidence: an introduction
A consensus on the importance of labor market institutions in general does not appear
to be imminent (Freeman 2005). However, the evidence for a detrimental impact is
possibly strongest for tax wedges and beneﬁts. In an inﬂuential study based on the
work of Bassanini and Duval (2006), the OECD (2006a) argues high tax wedges and
generous unemployment beneﬁts have a signiﬁcant negative impact on labor market
outcomes. Many other studies ﬁnd results consistent with signiﬁcantly detrimental
effects of taxes and/or beneﬁts.23 Nickell, Nunziata and Ochel (2005) ﬁnd about two
thirds of their institutional explanation for patterns in OECD labor market outcomes is
accounted for by variations in the tax/beneﬁt system.
Baker, Glyn, Howell and Schmitt (2005), while skeptical of the institutional expla-
nation in general, conclude that the ﬁndings on taxes and beneﬁts are more robust than
other ﬁndings. However, they argue that, while the rise in tax wedges and/or beneﬁts
over time in some countries tended to coincide with worsening labor market outcomes
in those countries – generating a signiﬁcant estimate – this does not appear to be the
case in recent times. Like Blanchard (2006), they argue that simple cross-sectional
22 If beneﬁts allow people to hold out for better quality matches that are less likely to result in termination
of employment, the effects of beneﬁts on equilibrium employment can be positive.
23 These include Amable, Demmou and Gatti (2006), Nickell (1997, 2004), and Belot and van Ours (2004)
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analysis shows those countries with worse employment outcomes do not necessarily
have higher tax wedges and/or beneﬁts.24
The lack of consensus can be partially explained by strong priors and data too weak
to reject those priors (Freeman 2005). Another complicating factor is the possibility
that the effect of taxes and beneﬁts depends on broader labor market conditions, as
suggested in the theoretical section above. For example, the European Commission
(2004) study on the EU15 ﬁnds that the negative effect of the tax wedge on employ-
ment is greatest in those European countries with intermediate levels of trade union
co-ordination, consistent with the study of Daveri and Tabellini (2000) on OECD coun-
tries. We do not investigate this feature in detail, but note trade union density is about
the same in the new members as for the EU15, bargaining generally takes place at the
ﬁrm level and co-ordination is low (Ederveen and Thissen 2004), which would suggest
a smaller impact of tax wedges.
4.3 Evidence: the new EU member states
Ederveen and Thissen (2004) focus on four CEE countries, using panel data from
OECDcountriesthatinclude Poland, Slovakia, Hungary andtheCzech Republic. They
ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant positive relationships between unemployment and the tax
wedge for two speciﬁcations out of three; while the effect of beneﬁts duration is signiﬁ-
cant and positive for one speciﬁcation out of three. They show how their speciﬁcations
do a poor job of explaining the variations in unemployment across their four converg-
ing countries, conclude that labor market institutions cannot account for employment
variations and proceed to list broader factors that may be important. Given the restruc-
turing taking place in the CEE countries, this is one plausible reading of their results.
Another interpretation, consistent with the analysis conducted so far, is that any rela-
tionships that may apply in some parts of the OECD may not apply in others, and by
extension may not apply to the CEE countries.
Vork et al. (2006) address this issue. Cross plots indicate potential differences
in the magnitude of the effect of tax wedges on employment between the EU15 and
eight new members of the EU, with the effect being negative for the new members but
close to zero in the EU15. Cross plots of marginal effective tax rates and labor market
outcomes indicate differences in the size and sign of the relationship.
For their panel of eight CEE countries over a maximum of nine years, pooled OLS
regressions of overall employment on tax wedges yield a signiﬁcantly negative coefﬁ-
cient of −0.68, so that a one percentage point fall in the wedge would lead to a 0.68%
rise in employment. Fixed effects estimates are an insigniﬁcant −0.23, but are similar
to those estimated by European Commission (2004) and by Vork et al. (ibid) for Eu-
rope.25 For the EU15, the use of ﬁxed effects does not affect the coefﬁcient materially,
but it does for the CEE countries. This is open to interpretation. On the one hand,
it may be that the variables included adequately control for country speciﬁc effects in
24 Baccaro and Rei (2005) also provides a critique.
25 Formal regression analysis in Vork et al. rejected the equality of coefﬁcients between the EU15 and CEE8
in most models, but this is presumably a rejection of the more stringent hypothesis that all coefﬁcients are
equal, not just the tax wedge.
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the EU15 but not in the CEE8. On the other hand, it suggests much of the variation
in the EU15 is of wedges over time while there has not been such variation over their
sample period for the CEE countries. Thus, the ﬁxed effects are capturing much of the
static cross-sectional relationship the tax wedge coefﬁcient could capture for the CEE
countries.26 It is therefore unclear whether tax wedges have a more detrimental effect
in the CEE countries than the rest of Europe.
Vork et al. (2006) present speciﬁcations with many alternative labor market mea-
sures. The OLS coefﬁcient for low education employment is signiﬁcantly negative
(−0.69) but that for youths is insigniﬁcant (−0.325). They also ﬁnd a signiﬁcant ne-
gative coefﬁcient for the effect of tax wedges on unemployment. The authors do not
employ a measure of beneﬁts but use indicators of marginal effective tax rates, which
do not yield consistent signs across speciﬁcation or methodology.
One possible criticism of this analysis is that it ignores much of the very important
restructuring that has taken place in these economies. In a panel study based on similar
data, Fabrizio (2006) partially address this criticism by decomposing the evolution
of employment into industry, temporal and country effects. She ﬁnds a signiﬁcant
negative effect of tax wedges on the country-speciﬁc employment outcomes, with a
ﬁxed effects coefﬁcient of –0.67.
On balance, the regression evidence does suggest a detrimental role for tax wedges,
but not for beneﬁts, in the CEE countries. We have pointed to sources of criticisms of
the panel regression approach. The data available is still relatively limited and offers
little variation for identiﬁcation that is easily interpretable.27 As the dataset grows in
the coming years, it will include many of the recent, current and planned future re-
forms, yielding additional sources of variation and degrees of freedom. In the next
section, we offer an approach that is simultaneously less demanding of the data cur-
rently available and complementary to panel regression research.
5. The relationships between taxes, beneﬁts and labour market outcomes: non-
parametric measures of association
This section investigates statistical relationships between beneﬁts, taxes and labor mar-
ket outcomes in the CEE10 countries. We incorporate the newest EU members, namely
Romania and Bulgaria, in our sample. We focus on a single cross-section, using 2005
data for taxes and beneﬁts and the 2001–2005 average for labor market outcomes. Data
availability on beneﬁts also motivates our use of a single cross-section.28
We estimate pairwise Kendall Tau correlations between the variables of interest.
Kendall Tau statistics are akin to Pearson correlations but more robust to outliers, are
26 An argument for OLS estimates has been made along these lines by Allard and Lindert (2006).
27 See Allard and Lindert (2006) and Amable et al. (2006) on this point.
28 While we could attempt to construct beneﬁts measures for more time periods, genuine changes in such
beneﬁts over time could be materially affected by measurement error, which in some panel regression spe-
ciﬁcations can severely bias the results. We use 2001-2005 averages for labour market outcomes to rule
out cyclical effects, although the results are not materially different for 2005 data. Arguably, any changes in
taxes or beneﬁts would be expected to have some sort of lagged effect, which could be captured in a dynamic
speciﬁcation.
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appropriate for smaller samples and make fewer distributional assumptions.29 Ap-
pendix 3 presents more traditional partial correlations. The exercise is less ambitious
than that implicit in panel regressions. We do not have a reduced form model of how
taxes and beneﬁts affect labor market outcomes, and the results cannot by themselves
imply a causal relationship between such variables. The panel on the left of Table 7
presents the Kendall Tau statistics for various employment measures. The right panel
gives the odds ratio. Table 8 gives corresponding statistics for unemployment and ac-
tivity. Before proceeding, bear in mind the samples sizes are small and that the test
sacriﬁces power in favor of robust estimates.
Table 7. Measures of association: employment
K-Tau Odds ratio
ages 25–54 ages 15–24 low-educ ages 25–54 ages 15–24 low-educ
Full wedge −0.24 −0.24 0.02 asd0.61 asd0.61 asd1.05
Wedge −0.09 −0.27 asd0 0.84 0.58 1.00
Ben 9 asd0.36 asd0.04 −0.04 2.12 1.09 0.91
Ben rat 0.23 −0.05 −0.14 1.60 0.91 0.76
Ben dur −0.61∗∗ −0.24 −0.06 0.24 0.61 0.89
Trap u 0.11 0.38 0.38 1.25 2.21 2.21
Notes: ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5%. Full wedge accounts for VAT. Ben rat is initial replacement ratio, Ben dur is
the duration of the main beneﬁt, Ben 9 is the average replacement over the ﬁrst 9 months. Trap u is the
unemployment trap.
Regarding tax wedges (with or without adjusting for VAT), the coefﬁcients in Ta-
ble 7 indicate a negative relationship between wedges and prime-age employment and
between wedges and youth employment, with a coefﬁcient of −0.24. The correspond-
ing odds ratio of 0.61 implies the variables are substantially more likely to be discor-
dant than concordant. The same does not hold for less educated workers.
In Table 8, there is a negative association between wedges and unemployment. We
also see a negative association between wedges and activity, especially for the youth.
We can interpret the negative association with activity in two ways. It can be the
arithmetic combination of an association with lower employment and unemployment.
Alternatively, we can interpret it as higher tax wedges discouraging workers from par-
ticipating in the labor force, which can also reduce unemployment. Given the negative
association with employment, the theoretical arguments are consistent with the latter
interpretation.30
29 The statistic is based on the number of concordant and discordant pairs of observations (a concordant
pair of observations on a scatter plot would be linked by a line with a positive slope; a discordant pair
by a negative slope). The statistic captures the idea that, if the number of concordant pairs exceeds the
number of discordant pairs, the variables are positively related, and vice versa. After accounting for ties and
standardizing thedifferenceforsample size, weachievetheKendall Tau“b”statistic T, where−1<T <+1.
A large positive number indicates a strong positive relationship, while a large negative number indicates a
strong negative relationship. The odds ratio of the probability of a concordant pair to a discordant pair is
then (1+T)/(1−T). For example, T = −0.25 between two variables implies two observations are 60%
as likely to be concordant as discordant. A good introduction is provided by Noether (2007) and the formal
treatment is available in Kendall (1970).
30 If participation falls (rises) because of the tax wedge, this should be associated with lower (higher) em-
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Table 8. Measures of association: unemployment and activity
K-Tau Odds ratio
Unemployment Activity Unemployment Activity
ages ages ages ages ages ages
Total 15–24 15–24 25–54 Total 15–24 15–24 25–54
Full wedge −0.16 −0.07 −0.31∗ −0.31 0.73 0.87 0.52 0.52
Wedge −0.22 −0.13 −0.48∗ −0.30 0.63 0.76 0.35 0.54
Ben 9 0.04 −0.13 −0.16∗ 0.30 1.09 0.76 0.73 1.84
Ben rat −0.09 −0.28 −0.12∗ 0.30 0.83 0.57 0.79 1.87
Ben dur 0.18 0.06 −0.15∗ −0.43 1.45 1.13 0.73 0.40
Trap u 0.02 −0.16 0.27∗ 0.04 1.05 0.73 1.74 1.09
Notes: ∗ signiﬁcant at 10%. Full wedge accounts for VAT. Ben rat is initial replacement ratio, Ben dur is
the duration of the main beneﬁt, Ben 9 is the average replacement over the ﬁrst 9 months. Trap u is the
unemployment trap.
Our combined measure of beneﬁts replacement and duration, Ben 9, yields incon-
sistent results, which depend on the population group and labor market outcome being
measured. Breaking down the beneﬁts measure into its ratio and duration compo-
nents yields interesting insights. The ratio follows a similar pattern to the combined
measure, being positively related to prime-age employment and activity but negatively
related for some of the less productive segments of the labor force.
However, the coefﬁcient of beneﬁts duration suggests a large and signiﬁcantly ne-
gative relationship with prime-age employment. The odds ratio of 0.24 implies that, if
country A has longer-lasting beneﬁts than country B, then, relative to country B, coun-
try A is about four times as likely to have lower employment than higher employment.
There is a negative relationship with youth employment. Table 8 also presents coef-
ﬁcients consistent with the view that long beneﬁts duration can adversely affect labor
market outcomes.
Recall the PCA in Section 2 found tax wedges related to both the outcome and
environment components. This implies that there is a relationship between tax wedges
and labor market outcomes in aggregate, one we ignored for the purposes of classifying
the CEE10. Speciﬁcally, the factor loadings suggested a positive relationship between
tax wedges and “bad” labor market outcomes: higher taxes are associated with worse
outcomes, which is consistent with our ﬁndings in this section. Our combined beneﬁts
measure, in yielding mixed results, is also consistent with the PCA, which did not ﬁnd
the combined measure correlated with the second component.
In summary, it appears that, for the CEE, distinguishing beneﬁts of long duration
from those that offer a high initial replacement ratio is important. The evidence is also
consistent with the view that tax wedges are discouraging labor force participation
and reducing equilibrium employment, especially for youth, in the CEE. In partial
answer to some of the criticisms of the panel literature, we do ﬁnd at least some of the
effect of wedges and beneﬁts can be found in the cross-sectional dimension. However,
ployment and perhaps lower (higher) unemployment. We see a negative relationship with employment,
activity and unemployment, which is consistent with this argument. Other theoretical explanations for a fall
in unemployment after the tax wedge would simultaneously imply higher employment.
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because there are few signiﬁcant coefﬁcients, the evidence is not strong. While this is
partly because of a low power test, we believe that this evidence neither weakens nor
strengthens the case against these labor market features for CEE10 countries.
6. Concluding comments
This study has used principal component analysis (PCA) to classify European coun-
tries according to their labor market outcomes and in terms of a labor market environ-
ment/policy component. The data suggest the new members of the European Union
should be classiﬁed separately from the existing members. They tend to have worse
labor market performance but an environment that is not necessarily less conducive
to those outcomes. These results ﬁt in with those of Ederveen and Thissen (2004),
and Vork et al. (2006), who conclude that labor market policies and institutions are
generally more ﬂexible in the CEE countries than the rest of Europe.
In particular, we show the medians of employment and activity rates for the less
productive segments of the population, namely the youth and those with less education,
are statistically signiﬁcantly lower in the CEE10. Indicators of prime-age outcomes are
not signiﬁcantly different. While the low-wage tax wedge is not statistically distinct,
beneﬁts measures are signiﬁcantly less generous in the CEE10. Taken in isolation, this
suggests it would be naive to assign worse labor market performance in these countries
to higher taxes and/or unemployment beneﬁts.
However, we investigate the possible relationships between taxes, beneﬁts and em-
ployment outcomes using data for the CEE10 countries to see if they can account for
variation within this group. Available empirical evidence proposes that, of all the in-
stitutional explanations for differences in labor market outcomes, tax wedges and the
beneﬁts system are leading candidates. On balance, it appears that high tax wedges
and/or inappropriate beneﬁts systems hinder the generation of desirable labor mar-
ket outcomes. Consistent with panel studies of new members of the EU, our non-
parametric analysis shows a negative relationship between the low-wage tax wedge
and employment or activity rates, particularly for the youth. We also ﬁnd that, while a
high beneﬁts ratio is not necessarily harmful, long beneﬁts duration is associated with
bad labor market outcomes.
Our work is complementary to panel studies of the CEE countries, which despite
their many advantages suffer from limited degrees of freedom and insufﬁcient sources
of variation, especially after allowing for ﬁxed effects. Future research will beneﬁt
from further sources of identiﬁcation produced by additional observations and the re-
forms currently under way. This will provide identiﬁcation over the time-dimension of
data. However, the availability of good time series information on beneﬁts remains an
obstacle. The use of dynamic panel methods could also become feasible. Some of the
effects of reforms may take time, so appropriately estimated dynamic speciﬁcations
would be desirable.
Finally, we sound a note of caution. These countries have been through a sub-
stantial period of transition. This period is not yet over. The ﬁnding that the new EU
members tend to have worse labor market performance but an environment that is not
AUCO Czech Economic Review, vol. 3, no. 1 87A. Behar
necessarily less conducive to those outcomes would be consistent with the view that
labor market institutions are of secondary importance relative to broader restructuring
still taking place, regardless of the within-group evidence we have found.
Those countries that are still far from completing the process of transition arguably
haveworselabormarketoutcomes. Fromamethodologicalpointofview, wehavetried
to take a snapshot of a set of economies that are in constant ﬂux. The labor markets
could be far from their long run equilibrium, which has two implications. First, the
traditional labor-market institutions theories concern themselves with long run equi-
librium employment/unemployment rates, so that they may not apply in our context.
Second, a snapshot taken with future data could produce a very different picture. Thus,
while a hangover from transition could account for the present dichotomy between
policies and outcomes, it would be interesting to see whether it persists into the future.
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Appendix 1: Construction and sourcing of data
Beneﬁts Beneﬁts data are constructed for 2005. Three measures of unemployment
beneﬁts are employed. Ben ratio is a measure of the initial replacement ratio of unem-
ployment beneﬁts relative to the average wage, net of taxes. Ben dur is the duration of
the initial beneﬁt in months. Countries with inﬁnite beneﬁts are assigned an arbitrarily
high value of 100 for use in the non-parametric analysis. Ben 9 combines both mea-
sures and accounts for potential secondary unemployment beneﬁts by calculating the
average ratio of beneﬁts relative to the average wage enjoyed over the ﬁrst nine months.
The beneﬁts measures as constructed do not allow for supplements given for depen-
dents and/or spouses and/or old age. We construct the measures using sources broadly
similar to those detailed in Schiff et al. (2006). The main sources are the detailed de-
scriptive data in Social Security Administration, Social Security Programs Throughout
the World: Europe 2006, the European Commission’s Labor Market Reforms database,
the OECD Taxing Wages 2004/2005 publication and individual country sources. Tax-
ing Wages was used for calculating average wages and average tax rates to compile
net beneﬁts as a ratio of net wages. This was done for the average wage or average
production worker wage.
GDP growth rates We use the average annual growth rates for the period 2001–5.
Labor market outcomes Data on employment (as % of population of that age),
unemployment (as % of those in the labor force) and activity rates (as % of population
of that age) are sourced from the Eurostat database using standard deﬁnitions. Youths
are people aged 15–24. For our measure of low-educated employment and activity, we
refer to people aged ﬁfteen and higher with education levels up to and including lower
secondary (ISCED levels 0–2). We take annual averages of quarterly data, but in some
cases not all quarters are available. Using data from a single quarter and/or using data
for those aged 24 and higher only does not change the results. In the body of the paper,
we use averages for 2001-2005.
Low-wage tax wedge This information is compiled by the European Commission
and is available at the Eurostat database. The indicator we use is applied takes account
of all social security contributions, payroll taxes and income taxes for a single worker
earning 67% of the average wage. We use 2005 values.
Low-wage tax wedge (VAT adjusted) We account for consumption taxes by adjust-
ing the Eurostat wedge to account for statutory VAT rates. This adjustment does not
materially affect the orderings of countries in the EU and hence does not inﬂuence any
of the results. The formula used is the following: tcons =(texcl+tc)/(1+tc), where the
subscripts cons, excl and c refer to the consumption-adjusted tax wedge, the Eurostat
wedge and the VAT rate respectively. The VAT rates are collected by the Tax Policy
Division in the IMF. We use 2005 values.
Minimum wages This is the ratio of the statutory minimum wage to the average
wage for 2005. Sources include OECD minimum wage information where availa-
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ble. Other observations constructed using the ILO Minimum Wages Database and the
OECD’s Taxing Wages 2005/2006 publication.
Traps 2005 Marginal effective tax rates (METRs) for typical households are pro-
vided as part of the Eurostat Structural Indicators. The Unemployment Trap measures
the METR faced by a single person moving from unemployment to a job earning 67%
of the average production wage. The low wage trap measures the transition from earn-
ingsat33%to67%oftheaverageproduction wage, andismeasuredforasingleperson
and a one-earner couple with no children.
Appendix 2
Table A1. Comparison of labor market outcomes in the CEE10 and EU15 (2005)
Employment % Unemployment % Activity %
Total Prime Youth Low Total Youth Total Prime Youth
15–64 25–54 15–24 Educated 15–64 15–24 15–64 25–54 15–24
EU15
median 67.5 80.7 38.7 36.6 7.6 16.1 72.4 86.4 48.7
mean 66.64 79.49 40.81 37.59 7.07 16.6 71.84 84.78 47.33
CEE10
median 60.15 76.85 25.25 20.56 8.1 19.3 68.65 85.8 34.3
mean 60.19 76.97 26.09 21.38 9.8 20.92 66.82 84.42 33.04
Ratio
median 0.89 0.95 0.65 0.56 1.07 1.2 0.95 0.99 0.7
mean 0.9 0.97 0.64 0.57 1.39 1.26 0.93 1 0.7
Pmedians 0.01 0.19 0.01 0.01 0.15 0.3 0.02 1 0.01
PEU15>CEE10 0.81 0.66 0.87 0.9 0.33 0.37 0.79 0.5 0.83
Notes: Pmedians denotes the probability that the medians in the CEE10 and EU15 countries are equal, given
the observed data, is less than the number indicated; PEU15>CEE10 is the probability that the observed value
for a given EU15 country is higher than that of a CEE10 country.
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Wedge 0.55 0.26 0.29 0.58 0.68 0.14 −0.64 0.17 −0.62 0.19 −0.13 0.81 −0.42 0.41
Ratio −0.82 0.05 −0.69 0.13 −0.78 0.07 0.64 0.17 0.56 0.24 −0.32 0.54 −0.46 0.35
Duration 0.18 0.73 −0.49 0.33 −0.71 0.12 0 1 −0.22 0.68 0.19 0.72 −0.70 0.12
Trap u 0.34 0.52 0.40 0.44 0.74 0.09 −0.27 0.61 −0.20 0.70 0.01 0.99 0.22 0.67
Notes: Pmedians denotes the probability that the medians in the CEE10 and EU15 countries are equal, given
the observed data, is less than the number indicated; PEU15>CEE10 is the probability that the observed value
for a given EU15 country is higher than that of a CEE10 country.
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